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Response of the Turkish Government
1 November 2001
REPLY OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO THE REPORT
ON THE VISITS CARRIED OUT BY THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE
FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE (CPT)
FROM 10 TO 16 DECEMBER 2000, 10 TO 15 JANUARY 2001, 18 TO 21 APRIL 2001
AND 21 TO 24 MAY 2001
The report on the visits to Turkey conducted by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture from 10 to 16 December 2000, 10 to 15 January 2001, 18 to 21 April 2001 and 21 to 24 May 2001 was transmitted to our Government by letter of 17 July 2001 from Silvia Casale, President of the CPT. Our replies to the observations made in the report are set out below by subject and in the order of the paragraphs in the report.
Paragraph 13
Information has already been given to the Committee on the gases used in the prison interventions. These tear gases contain pepper gas and Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) and have no lasting effect on human health. There have been no forensic medical institute findings to date, either in Turkey or abroad, to the effect that these gases have a neurological effect engendering temporary loss of control over bodily movements.
Paragraphs 14 and 15
The Eyüp Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, Istanbul, has opened an investigation into the allegations made against the security forces in connection with the operation conducted in dormitory C1 at Bayrampaşa Closed Prison. As part of this investigation, proceedings have been brought before the Eyüp Criminal Court against 166 remand and sentenced prisoners on charges of rebellion against the prison administration.
As the CPT knows, during “Operation Return to Life”, illegal terrorist organisations poured kerosene over some of their own members and set fire to them, (these acts were witnessed by the general public and the press), in protest against the operation and the transfers to F-type prisons. However, in order to denigrate the security forces in the eyes of international public opinion, the terrorist organisations claimed that those deaths had been caused by the security forces.
In Bayrampaşa Prison, as in the other prisons and as indicated in the incident report, terrorist offenders, in dormitories with 80 to 100 occupants, started the fire. It was impossible to control the fire because of the fact that the security forces had intervened with the aid of tear gas before the prisoners started the fire in that area and that the prisoners were using the LPG bottles located in the prison as flame-throwers against the security forces.
The report drawn up by the three inspectors appointed by the Ministry of Justice confirms that the prisoners started the fire.
Experience in dormitory-system prisons has shown that members of terrorist organisations who confess to their offences, give information about their organisation or fail to observe the organisation’s discipline during police interrogation or during trial are interrogated under torture by their organisations, killed or forced into acts such as hunger strikes. In the past five years, sixteen inmates, held for terror offences, have been killed by members of their own organisations. It has become apparent that most of those who lost their lives during the death fast and those who were burned to death during the prison interventions were persons sacrificed by their organisations in this way.
The discrepancies between the information set out in the incident report and the statements made to the CPT delegation by prisoners who were in the dormitory concerned at the time of the intervention are not surprising, given the strict organisational discipline to which these persons are subject. It must be borne in mind that on the instructions of their organisations, these people act according to specific disciplinary rules.
The investigation opened by the Eyüp Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office into the allegations made against the security forces involved in the operation at Bayrampaşa Prison is in progress. The issues to be investigated include how the fire started, who started it, whether or not the gases used during the intervention caused the fire to spread, what types of weapon caused the injuries of those who died or were injured during the intervention, what types of weapon made the marks found inside the building and on the walls and whether or not these weapons belonged to the security forces. Independent experts are carrying out investigations and examinations on the spot. The investigation continues.
Paragraph 17
Some prisoners belonging to terrorist organisations regard applications to various organisations to the effect that they have been ill-treated and tortured as a specific form of struggle. The prisoners concerned accordingly claim that the bruises, abrasions and injuries received during the turmoil arising from resistance to the security forces during the prison interventions occurred during their transfers.
Paragraph 19
The Law on Prison Monitoring Boards does not contain any provisions preventing the monitoring boards from acting as independent observers during prison interventions. Under Section 7 of the law, the boards may visit prisons whenever they deem it necessary. It would not, therefore, be inappropriate to regard prison interventions as ranking foremost among the situations where such visits are considered necessary. In addition, public prosecutors will retain their duties and powers regarding supervision and monitoring in prisons.
Paragraph 21
During the admission of the persons transferred to F-type prisons as a result of the prison interventions, it was confirmed by their initial medical examinations that the great majority of prisoners who bore bruises and abrasions on their hands or other parts of their bodies had received their injuries in the course of the interventions.
The allegations of ill-treatment during admission to the prisons have been proved unfounded by the enquiries and investigations conducted. For example, a prisoner claimed to have been raped with a fluorescent light bulb during his admission to Kandıra F-type Prison, but withdrew his statement when the claim was disproved by medical and technical findings during the investigation.
Likewise, as regards prisoner X (*), who alleged to have been sexually abused with a truncheon and a fluorescent light bulb during his transfer to Kocaeli F-type Prison, the report on the initial examination by three doctors during his admission to prison and the forensic medical report also signed by three doctors show the allegations to be unfounded. When later required to give evidence, the prisoner gave explanations inconsistent with those in his initial statements. The same applies to prisoner Y (*), who made similar allegations. The medical reports relating to both claims are appended.
It is worth noting that allegations of ill-treatment during transfer were not made during these prisoners’ admission to prison, but only after a certain lapse of time.
Under Article 226 of the Prison Administration and Sentence Enforcement Regulations, prisoners are not allowed to have long hair or beards, in the interests of their own health. This is entirely a matter of institutional hygiene. The shaving of hair and beards cannot on any account have a punitive character. We do not share the Committee’s view in that respect. Disciplinary penalties are clearly provided for in the Enforcement Regulations and the internal regulations, and they do not include the shaving of hair and beards.
At institutions such as prisons, which are vulnerable and high-risk places in matters of security, attaining tranquility and maintaining order is of utmost importance. Therefore, it is necessary that everyone entering such institutions be searched. The search may be more meticulous depending on the nature of the offences committed by those admitted to the prison. In many West European prisons serious offenders and drug offenders are strip-searched. The European Court of Human Rights has dismissed applications concerning meticulous searches of this kind, considering that visitors and prisoners must comply with the obligation to undergo a search at the entrance to prisons, where security is the rule.
Under Section 7/a of the Law on the Organisation, Duties and Authorities of the Gendarmerie, the external security of prisons falls within the responsibility of the gendarmerie. Article 70 of the Regulations on the Organisation, Duties and Authorities of the Gendarmerie stipulates that prisoners be searched on admission and that any weapons, devices that might be used for an escape, valuables or money in their possession be seized. The person concerned is issued with a document indicating the nature and the number or amount of the items handed over.
_________________
(*) In accordance with Article 11, paragraph 3, of the
Convention, the prisoners' names have been deleted.
If the prison staff has the suspicion that a prisoner entering the prison is hiding something anywhere on his body, he is requested first to remove his clothes, then to remove the object in question and hand it over to the security forces. If he resists, his clothes may be forcibly removed under Rule 63 of the European Prison Rules. If the staff can remove the hidden object without the necessity of physical contact with the prisoner, it is removed; otherwise, the prison doctor is informed and requested to remove the object. The search procedure is conducted in a special room and care is taken to respect the prisoner’s dignity. This necessity hardly ever arises in our prisons.
In various decisions concerning British prisoners stripped and given an anal search on admission to prison, the European Commission of Human Rights has found that this type of search will not be degrading treatment for prisoners who are aware of the risks for prison security engendered by the violent acts they commit in prison.
Paragraphs 22 and 23
For headcounts in F-type prisons, no physical coercion is used against prisoners who come downstairs in response to the summons and stand side-by-side in such a way that the staff can see them. There is no question of prisoners being made to “stand to attention”.
During the first few days following the transfers to F-type prisons, the physical coercion applied to prisoners who persisted in refusing to come downstairs for the headcount consisted of taking them by the arms and bringing them downstairs. As stated in various decisions of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, prisoners are required to comply with the obligations of prison discipline and sentence enforcement. Consequently, this cannot be regarded as degrading treatment. The Ministry of Justice inspectors who examined the allegations that this procedure constituted degrading treatment concluded that the allegations were groundless. The inspectors are members of the judiciary and their independence is guaranteed by the Constitution. The doubts expressed by the Committee concerning the findings of this enquiry are therefore unnecessary.
Paragraphs 24 and 25
At the time of the CPT’s visit in May 2001, the only area for communal activities, which had been brought into service in the F-type prisons, was the multi-purpose hall, while the other areas were under construction. As of 30 June 2001, all the communal activity areas foreseen for the F-type prisons were completed and brought into service, and at present none of the facilities planned are lacking. For the time being, the great majority of prisoners convicted of terrorist offences still refuse to enter the communal activity areas, but they are exercising their rights to open visits and to the use of the telephone.
The expectation is that in the near future the death fasts will end and all prisoners will take advantage of the communal facilities. Far from receiving acceptance and support, the death fasts arouse a negative reaction among the general public.
Paragraph 26
Prisoners are able to make use of the exercise yards adjacent to their accommodation units all day, without restriction. They are also free to use the multi-purpose hall and the outdoor sports ground in accordance with the prison management plan and their rehabilitation programmes. The yards adjacent to prisoners’ rooms measure 50m2 in area and thus offer three prisoners fairly broad opportunities for physical exercise.
Paragraph 27
In line with the CPT recommendation made in this paragraph, a call system has been installed in all rooms to enable prisoners to reach the prison staff easily in emergencies; warning lights have also been placed in the main corridors to make it easier for staff to see that there is a call. When staff see the warning light and the number of the room using the call system, they immediately go to the room in question. To make this compulsory, the switch for turning off the warning light is placed immediately outside the door of the room. This compels the staff concerned to go to the room door.
Paragraphs 30 and 31
Solitary confinement is a measure applied pursuant to a court decision or disciplinary penalty. In Western Europe a person held in solitary confinement is normally placed in an isolation cell ranging from 5.5 to 8.5m2 in area, with small windows, which are usually painted over. There are no such areas in F-type prisons.
The small number of prisoners indicated as having been held in solitary confinement for more than six months are accommodated, due to the dangerous security risk they have, in rooms, measuring 11m2, with a bathroom and toilet. Radio, television, newspapers and books are available and they have access to an exercise yard all day. These are the prisoners’ own rooms. The prisoners accommodated in these rooms are leaders of the terrorist organisations, who have planned numerous terrorist acts and ordered their fellow-prisoners to be burned to death as a protest during the prison interventions. They selected the members of their organisations to take part in the death fast and they supervise the aforementioned “organisational discipline”.
The European Commission of Human Rights has dismissed a number of applications alleging that solitary confinement was in breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Commission considered that the applicants were subjected to exceptional detention arrangements, characterised by their exclusion from the prison community and their confinement to a security area, that the government concerned had explained the security requirements which governed the devising of these arrangements and that the applicants were dangerous and had used firearms at the time of their arrest; with these in mind, the Commission concluded that there were pressing reasons for subjecting the applicants to arrangements directly based on security measures.
Examples of such decisions include the Commission’s decision of 8 July 1978 on applications 7572/76, 7586/76 and 7577/76, D.R.No.14, pages 64 ff, and its report of 16 December 1982 on application 8463/78.
However, the prisoners in question are free to make use of all the communal activity areas brought into service in the F-type prisons. They persist in refusing to take part in communal activities and also prevent other prisoners belonging to their organisations from participating. The few prisoners belonging to organisations who make use of the communal activity areas, and even the other prisoners, are branded traitors by these persons and threatened with death.
Paragraph 33
Circulars were issued to the effect that the approach to persons taking part in hunger strikes and death fasts should be in line with the recommendations made by the National Health Council at its 214th meeting on 20 and 21 December 2000. Essentially, the recommendations were to refrain from forcible treatment of prisoners who were conscious and refused medical treatment, and to intervene in accordance with medical ethics if a prisoner lost consciousness and the faculty of consent. Accordingly, no steps, which might warrant the reservation indicated in this paragraph of the CPT report, are being taken and no practices to the contrary have been reported.
Paragraphs 34 and 35
There is no such practice as shackling prisoners receiving hospital treatment to their beds with handcuffs.
Given the capacity of prisoner wards in hospitals, some temporary difficulties are sometimes encountered when demand exceeds capacity, but the necessary arrangements are made as soon as possible to overcome these difficulties. Apart from this, investment continues without interruption in order to improve general material conditions in hospitals and conditions in prisoner wards.
Paragraphs 36, 37 and 38
As the Committee might have observed, the draft Enforcement Magistrates Law and the draft Law on Prison Monitoring Boards have been adopted by the Grand National assembly of Turkey and have come into force. The Committee has been supplied with the full texts of these laws.
We are pleased to note that the Committee, too, considers the decision to have members of the monitoring boards selected by the judicial authorities as a suitable approach.
We share the CPT’s view that it would not be compatible with the nature and functions of the monitoring boards for their members to be formal representatives of non-governmental organisations. However, there is nothing to prevent members of such organisations from being selected as members of a monitoring board. In this respect, it is important that such persons should not have lost their impartiality.
Rather than persons in Turkey who could take part in the work of the prison monitoring boards, the Ministry of Justice is in favour of the CPT proposing persons with international experience in this area, especially from Britain, the country that provided the model for the boards. For example, as part of the co-operation initiated with the British Council, a co-operation project has been drawn up for the training of members of Turkey’s prison monitoring boards.
The Law on Prison Monitoring Boards provides for implementing regulations to come into force within six months. These regulations have been drawn up and came into force on publication in the Official Gazette of 7 August 2001.
The regulations provide for a transparent election procedure, and the qualifications sought in candidates and the rules governing their election are clearly specified in Article 5. This article also provides for the qualifications sought in candidates to be advertised on court notice boards, in local newspapers and through similar channels.
Under Article 15 of the regulations, members of the monitoring boards will be given training in the general principles of prison law, the general principles of sentence enforcement law, the judicial and prison system, sentence enforcement legislation, international rules and human rights. As part of this training, under the heading of prison security, it is also considered advisable to provide them with information on prison interventions.
Under Article 8 of the regulations, members of the monitoring boards will be able to interview prisoners in private.
Under Article 9 of the regulations, monitoring boards will draw up a report setting out their views and proposals at least once every three months.
In conclusion, all the proposals put forward by the CPT with regard to the monitoring boards have been included in the regulations.
Note: The Appendices to the response are available in PDF format.